

Abstract



THE POWER OF VIOLENCE IN POLITICS

In the present paper, we explore the role and the power of violence in politics. Accordingly, in Hannah Arendt's political phenomenology, violence holds an 'instrumental' role, constituting the medium for the domination or even the imposition of political authority. Consequently, the reduction and depreciation of the true meaning of politics is inevitable. Additionally, the reduction of politics to violent domination is demonstrable in the tradition of political philosophy. In particular, it existed in ancient philosophy, when defining the different forms of governments (oligarchic, monarchic regimes), as well as in contemporary political philosophy. Specifically, John Stuart Mill believes that the desire to dominate over others in a violent and aggressive way is due to human nature. Max Weber defined the State as the domination of men over others on the basis of supposedly legitimate violence, while John Locke considered that the political authority is allowed to use violence in order to enforce the law and to protect the common interest. Moreover, Locke maintains, first, that violence refers to the transition from the natural to pre-political community, and, second, that violence is legitimized within the political community.

Αναστασία-Σοφία Αλεξιάδου
Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας, Ιστορικός και μεταδιδακτορική
Ερευνήτρια Ηθικής και Πολιτικής Φιλοσοφίας.

MORAL INTEGRITY IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*.
THE EXAMPLE OF GYGES

This paper examines the relationship between justice and human morality and the meaning of moral integrity by selectively focusing on Plato's *Republic*, and specifically on Book 2 of this work. There, Plato employs one of his most famous myths, the myth of the ring of Gyges, in order to clarify the nature of justice and its relationship to the essence of man. Before referring to the platonic notion of justice and moral integrity, the paper is associating platonic theory with the ideas of Democritus, the pre-Socratic philosopher who describes the just man in a way quite similar to that of Plato. More specifically,

Democritus argues that the just man should never “do wrong” not because he is motivated by the fear or shame of being found out but as a matter of self-respect. However, in the second book of the *Republic*, Glaucon and Adimantus reformulate the question of justice by asking Socrates to answer in a satisfactory manner whether justice is good for its consequences or for its own sake. The question of whether justice is valuable or not for its own sake and also for its consequences is treated in various ways throughout the course of the dialogue. While Socrates in books two to nine defends the thesis that justice is good for its own sake, being a factor of mental harmony and happiness, he returns to the question of rewards in the tenth book by arguing that justice works in our personal interest, or at least that this is usually the case. In conclusion, justice in the platonic text is closely related to the morality of the person because the just man fashions his soul in such a way as to lead a just life and not simply commit a just act from time to time. This means that the moral life is superior to other ways of life and is valuable for its own sake, even though that does not exclude the possibility that society (or even the gods) may offer certain rewards to the just man given that the support of just behaviour is a necessity for human polities, that is, for men in their worldly state. In its inner core the soul is good and untouched by decay, and this means that it is just. Justice thus becomes an unconditional principle which ensures the moral integrity of the person.

Μαρία Βενετή
Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας

THE PRIVY COUNSELLOR OF EMPERORS MICHAEL PSELLOS.
A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

The spiritual superstructure of the *Chronographia* by the Byzantine philosopher and privy counselor Michael Psellos (1018-1078 AD) can be divided into three main parts: a) the examination of man as nature and as a person with body, soul and spirit, b) the perception of history as a society with physical and material background, and c) the use of philosophical counseling. The common denominators of these parts are: a) ancient Greek philosophy, and b) Christian metaphysics, both

of which in fact the Byzantine scholar does not think can be applied to the course of history. The ancient Greek philosophical tradition is considered an appropriate and powerful –though unrepeatable– past, and the Christian theological tradition as a way of introducing divine providence into this life. In general, Psellos conceived the public life of Byzantium as a microcosm-macrocosm, rather like a theatrical stage, where human games are played, which he tries to interpret through his intellectual enquiries.

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THE *PSYCHOLOGY OF LONELINESS* IN ARISTOTLE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Aristotelian analysis of the positive emotions associated with the presence of others, namely good friends, along with the negative and detrimental effects of their absence, can be described as the psychology of loneliness. The term refers to the psychology of a solitary person, who lives in physical and emotional isolation. Aristotle provides a clear picture of a person who lives in solitude. Life for a solitary person is hard or impossible since man, by nature, is a social creature and wants to live with others. Solitude causes one to be apathetic and inactive, which eventually leads to misery, far from the goals of happiness and virtue. By contrast, a truly satisfactory human life requires sharing one's fundamental activities with others, by not just living in their company but sharing in discussion and thought. As Aristotle states, human beings should not lock themselves within the confines of their own private world, but share a life of moral excellence with others.

Βασιλική Καλδή
Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας του ΕΚΠΑ.

THE WILL FOR STRENGTH, NIETZSCHE'S FUNDAMENTAL
INTERPRETATIVE FORCE

Nietzsche is interested in the concept of being through including all oppressed impetuses and transcendent forces, accepting the existence of being and the ethics of “basic” and rejecting the traditional views of moral barriers, penalties and ascetic principles. The Overman redefines himself. It is from this point that Nietzsche’s “freedom” or “will for strength” starts, since Man as generally a combination of soul and body is significant for the German philosopher. Nietzsche rejects any philosophy that undermines human creativity. On the other hand, he supports the Dionysian principle of “death to God” and the return to a new era of innocence. He links it, “apart from the good and the bad”, with the natural world of eternal recurrent life. Thus, he stresses the significance for the subject to search for truth and the non-acceptance of a tradition that eliminates the cosmogonist and creative strength of this subject. Nietzsche’s moral critique is based on a strict critique of Christian morality, which has a “vicious consciousness” at the core of its thinking. According to the philosopher, this consciousness is the most important psychological and social disease of his era. However, is Nietzsche’s thought a transcendent anthropocentric perception of modernity that aims to reform the principles that attach to any previous philosophical school or is it simply a total refutation of European evolutionary thought?

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Θεσσαλονίκης.

TEACHING ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE GREEK
UNIVERSITY.

IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND PHILOSOPHICAL POTENTIAL

This essay deals with the teaching of ancient Greek philosophy in Greek universities and, more specifically, it deals with the ideological problems with which this teaching is associated, as well as

with the philosophical horizon that is opened up by it. The first exemplary field of reference of ideological problems is the interpretative angle on the Sophists and Plato in Tsatsos' work titled *The Social Philosophy of the Ancient Greeks*, which has been the syllabus of his lessons for decades. In his work, the Sophists were negatively judged because they were relativists in the matter of morality and knowledge, because they were agnostic towards the question of the existence of gods, and additionally because they were also the founders of critical thinking and of exclusive trust in man's reason and not the authority of myth, religion or law. In the same work, however, Plato is understood positively within the framework of the ideology of Helleno-Christianity, as he is considered as the cornerstone representing Hellenism, in order for Hellenism to later complete Christianity, and finally for them both to form Helleno-Christianity, the only proper ideology, in the opinion of Tsatsos, for Greeks. The second exemplary field of reference for ideological problems is the edition of Plato's *Symposium* by the celebrated scholar I. Sikoutris, with an introduction, translation into modern Greek, and commentary by Sikoutris. This publication was met with harsh criticism by the Church and the intellectuals-supporters of the Greco-Christian ideology who wrote a multitude of libels including threats, slanders and insults against it; the reason was that Sikoutris' extensive introduction to this platonic work did not serve, but, on the contrary, negated the Greco-Christian narrative by which the views of Plato and the ancient Greeks were held to be in harmony with those of Christianity. Last, we examine an exemplary field of the philosophical horizon in which the teaching of ancient Greek philosophy in Greek academia can be approached; this field includes the re-evaluation of Callicles, the founder of the radical course for philosophy that was later continued by Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and Negri, and whose main reference is the subject of power.

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THE EMPIRICAL CONCEPTUAL SINGULARITY OF OCKHAM
VERSUS THE INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTUAL MULTIPLICITY
OF KANT

The main purpose of this article is to highlight the crucial contribution that Ockham made. What Ockham did was to question the substance of platonic ideas. He supported that these forms of meanings belong entirely in the mind and the only case that can have a correspondence in the external world are the things that are singular in the external world (outside of the mind). In other words, everything that can be named a multiple conceptual being does not belong to reality but only belongs in the contents of the mind. The reason that the mind operates by using concepts is seated in the symbolic and semiotic process that is necessary in order to gain understanding. Kant supported this approach, and he realized that the problem lies not only between singular and multiple beings, but everything in the mind, beyond the way it is represented in the external world. This theory has evolved into implying that the composite objective being is derived from the subjective mind and, consequently, back to the main problem, which concerns communication between the mind and the external world. In other words the problem of the thing itself.

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ODYSSEAS ELYTIS: ‘MARINA OF THE ROCKS’. A PHILOSOPHICAL
JOURNEY OF THE SOUL THROUGH THE UNIVERSE

This paper attempts a new reading of Elytis’ poem ‘Marina of the Rocks’. Given the poet’s familiarity with philosophy, our encounter with the poem requires an alternative version of Elytis’ spirit, focusing on the conviction of ancient Greek philosophers of the immortality of the soul. The descent of the soul into the body and then its return to the beyond create the imaginary landscape of an ambivalent and yet highly poetical reality, associated with the beliefs primarily of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Elytis’ poetics opens itself to the light of

the Orphic mysteries, without however losing its coherence, with the traditional manifestation of the singular image, in absolute harmony with the dreamlike specificity of his own personal mode of expression. The sea, light and air function as a vortex by which the soul descends into flesh, transfixes itself to stone, and afterwards ascends to become one again with its source. This paper seeks to cast light on a different aspect of analyses that have already been made, without wishing to suggest that it is only way to read the poetical work of Odysseas Elytis. Let it stand, rather, as an attempt –perhaps utopian – at a reading, which hopes to accord with the prismatic nature of the writing of the poet.

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Μεταδιδακτορική ερευνήτρια στο Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο.

THE JUDICIOUS SPECTATOR AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF SYMPATHY IN DAVID HUME'S WORK

The main argument of Hume's moral theory is that sympathy, innate in all humans, is the source of morality. How could the philosopher mean that normativity can derive from the unstable and subjective sentiment? How could he dethrone reason from morality as he is accused of doing by careless readers? I argue that the key issue is not the sentiment of sympathy itself but a certain 'mechanism' of communication of our passions, something that, according to Hume, plays a decisive role in our moral nature. Hume does not aim at dethroning reason from moral judgement, for he thinks that reason should serve the passions by correcting them. Self-correction and retraction are indispensable for entering into the moral stance. But how can somebody enter into the moral stance and judge correctly? I suggest that in order to better understand Hume's moral theory, it is crucial to study an invisible feature of his thought, which the philosopher refers to on certain rare occasions without further clarifications: the 'judicious spectator'. Who exactly is the judicious spectator and what role does he play in Hume's moral theory? Can sympathy achieve universality through the moral philosophy of Hume? I conclude that

Hume has prepared the field for Kant's theory of the universality of morality, which is itself the foundation of the categorical imperative.

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REFUGEES, BORDERS, IDENTITIES: THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN HUMANISM

Human dignity implies the intrinsic and equal value of each human being; and, second, each and everyone's claim to a dignified human life. The idea that all human beings are born free and equal in rights and dignity reflects the foundational basis of humanism. It forms a moral and political framework for the basic values of freedom, equality and solidarity. As a principle it guarantees fundamental rights to everyone without discrimination, since every human being is part of one and the same human community regardless of nationality, cultural origin or religious tradition. As the refugee crisis continues, too many politicians and ordinary people in the current public debate tend to see refugees as a threat to the European community and its security. As a consequence respect for basic rights seems to be forgotten and refugees are excluded from access to a dignified life. The refugee crisis reveals our society's inability to uphold its values on the one hand, and to address the refugee problem on the other. We face two moral tasks: (1) to treat refugees in a morally justified way; (b) to address the systemic problems that force refugees to flee their home countries.

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THE TROLLEY PROBLEM. THE POSING OF A MORAL DILEMMA
BY PHILIPPA FOOT

This article presents the so-called Trolley Problem, first raised in 1967 by the philosopher Philippa Foot. This particular problem poses a moral dilemma, which has occupied and continues to occupy the speculation of theoreticians and philosophers. The problem of the runaway trolley brings into sharp relief the dilemma surrounding the uncontested right of man to life. Each person has the right to life, but the duty not to interfere with the lives of others.

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A CRITIQUE OF THE CONDITIONS OF CHANTAL JAQUET'S
THEORY OF "TRANSCASSES"

In this article we shall approach in a critical manner the conditions of Chantal Jaquet's theory of the "transclasses" as exemplar and singular cases of social non-reproduction. In her work, Jaquet aims at thinking through the causes, limits, and various aspects of a significant, albeit neglected, empirical phenomenon. In attempting to cast further light on the theory's underlying assumptions and presuppositions, i.e. conditions, we shall address not only its potential critical limitations, but its strengths and weaknesses, notwithstanding its resourceful attempt to clarify the proper speculative means to think about a complex, multidimensional problem. By devising and then putting to use such conceptual resources, the said theory contributes to the overarching project of unconditioning the metaphysics of the social sciences and paves the way for the reconceptualisation of social reproduction as a whole on the basis of differential (non-)reproducibility.

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